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Economic historians have a rich literature applying 
economic theory to accepted "economics" topics like 
unemployment, income, trade, and development. A smaller 
number of economists apply economic theory to the history of 
social institutions not normally included in the discipline. 
For example, Posner (1980) uses economic theory to explain 
economic functions of institutions like the extended family 
in primitive society. 
This paper attempts to follow the tradition of 
economists like Posner. In particular, this paper reviews 
an economic theory of religion and uses the theory to 
explain changes in attitudes toward hell, heaven, and divine 
retribution in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. 
The hypothesis is straightforward. Religion serves a 
number of important functions, one of which is to provide an 
alternative to the state and to the local community in 
enforcing good social behavior in general and property 
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rights in particular. As the nature of the state's power, 
of the influence of the local community, and of economic 
activity change, religious doctrine changes in a manner 
predictable by economic theory. Although applied to a 
particular period and culture, the theory is perfectly 
general and has implications for behavior in other cultures 
and other periods in history. 
Before proceeding, two caveats are in order. First, the 
theory presented here does not promote or criticize religion 
itself. Nothing in the theory proves or disproves the 
existence of god. Both atheists and the devout can gain by 
understanding functions of the church complementary to its 
pure theological function. 
Second, the material presented here in no way intends to 
explain all of the diverse and important events during the 
thousand years of the Middle Ages, nor does it try to refute 
views by those outside economics. Doubtless students of 
history more qualified than this author will find counter 
examples and omissions. Economic theory cannot explain 
everything and in this case only attempts to provide some 
interesting insight into an important period in western 
history. 
I. The High Middle Ages 
The Middle Ages in western history encompass a period 
from the fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century to 
the beginning of the Renaissance in the sixteenth century. 
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The middle three hundred years, from the eleventh to the 
thirteenth century, are often included in an era termed the 
High Middle Ages since they represent a period of relative 
prosperity and progress. Of most interest for this work is 
the increase in the influence of the Roman Catholic Church 
in this period. 
By the beginning of the eleventh century, most of Europe 
has converted to Christianity and most of Asia and Africa to 
Islam. The middle of this century witnesses a significant 
increase in the power of the Roman Catholic Church, capped 
by the assumption of Papal authority in removing the crowned 
heads of temporal kingdoms. The century closes with the 
First Crusade, surely an impressive tribute to religious 
commitment. 
Papal temporal authority continues increasing in the 
twelfth century. Two more crusades are launched. Gothic 
art and architecture, much of it religiously inspired, 
highlight the middle of the century. 
The beginning of the thirteenth century marks the height 
of Roman Catholic Church power. Under the leadership of 
Pope Innocent III, church influence extends through every 
level of society. Crowned heads bow to Papal authority no 
less than common peasants. The Inquisition uses coercion 
and fear to enforce religious purity. The proverb about 
death and taxes is carried to its logical end as the church 
collects death taxes. Construction of the great cathedrals 
begins. 
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II. Rezoning Hell 
One of the less dramatic but perhaps more curious trends 
in the High Middle Ages is the topic of interest here: the 
change during the period in the attitude toward death and 
divine retribution. 2 Coincident with the increasing power 
of the Roman Catholic Church is an increasing church belief 
in the immediacy of judgement after death. 
Both before and in the first years after Europe's 
conversion to Christianity, death is viewed simply as sleep 
followed by one or another version of ascension to heaven 
for everyone at the end of time. 
By the beginning of the twelfth century, the church's 
attitude toward death has changed in an important way. Now 
the dead face the Last Judgement. A period of sleep still 
follows death, but the faithful are separated from sinners 
and non-believers at the end of time. The former ascend to 
heaven, the latter face eternal damnation in hell. 
A second important but gradual change in church doctrine 
accelerates in the twelfth century. A period of testing and 
trial called purgatory also now follows death. 3 In the 
early twelfth century, the church asserts that this period 
of trial is identical for everyone and is still followed by 
the Last Judgement. By the beginning of the thirteenth 
2The most important research on attitudes toward death 
through history is Aries (1981). 
3For a complete history of purgatory see LeGoff (1984). 
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century, church attitude toward purgatory evolves, as does
 
the concept of the Last Judgement.
 
Later in the thirteenth century, divine retribution
 
'takes on its most immediate and dramatic form. A person is 
surrounded before death by the forces of evil and of good. 
At the moment of death, the sum of the person's actions 
through life are judged. Those of sufficient faith and 
having lives of sufficient goodness ascend to heaven. Those 
without faith and with sinful lives descend to hell. 
Questionable cases go to purgatory, where they stay until 
the living act to save them through prayer and intercession. 
Notice the change in the church's view of death and 
divine retribution. In the early period, heaven is granted 
to all. Later the dead are judged and sent to heaven or 
hell at the end of time. Finally, judgement is i~~ediate, 
although in some cases not final. 
What explains this change? Aries (1981) sees the change 
as another element in the overall transition from the 
attitude that people are defined mainly as members of a 
community, with little personal identity, to a time when 
individual identity is acknowledged. This seems a 
reasonable hypothesis. Aries explains how a variety of 
death and burial practices, including the use of grave 
markers, reflects an increasing recognition of individual 
identity. 
There is perhaps an alternative, although not truly a
 




help explain this change and can also explain a number of 
other church activities during the High Middle Ages. 
Obviously, a discussion of these implications first requires 
an understanding of the economic theory of religion. It is 
to this subject we now turn. 
II. Economic Theory of Religion 
The economic theory of religion and the church is an 
extension of the theory of the firm. As in the theory of 
the firm, churches are assumed to maximize profit. Although 
a church is typically viewed as a non-profit organization, 
the assumption of profit maximization is still appropriate. 
Churches need resources to promote religious goals and 
churches gain revenue to the extent they manage their 
resources in an efficient (profit maximizing) manner. 
Churches also compete with profit-maximizing firms for 
resources in many markets so church success again depends on 
efficient behavior. Finally, the long-run survival of a 
church in part depends on its ability to maintain non­
negative wealth. 
The theory of the firm explains how each firm chooses 
products to offer for sale. Like profit-maximizing firms, 
the church offers the set of products which exploits 
economies of scope, gains from tied sales, comparative 
advantage, the cost of information, and other economies. 
The products commonly offered by churches include 
entertainment, control or prediction of future events, 
7
 
social insurance, and the promise of an appealing afterlife. 
The church also produces several valuable public goods, the 
most important being property rights enforcement. 4 
The entertainment offered by churches ranges from bingo 
to sacred music and includes valuable social activities. 
Because these church activities are substitutes for secular 
forms, the church attempts to suppress these secular 
activities or must compete with secular producers. The 
church earns revenue by explicitly excluding non-prayers or 
by using coercion. 
Similarly, when they predict or attempt to alter future 
events, churches can sell these directly to recipients. To 
the extent that the predictions or alterations of events are 
public goods, churches earn revenue by using price 
discrimination, coercion, and innovations discussed below. 
The church offers the same sort of social insurance 
produced by modern states who assure income to the poor, 
elderly, and other deserving groups. That modern states 
provide this function suggests that the church tends to be 
less important in providing it. Similarly, Posner (1980) 
shows that very small cohesive (usually primitive) groups, 
provide social insurance to group members since group 
members are sensitive to the fortunes of other group 
members. 
4For a complete treatment of the economic theory of 
religion see Bold and Hull (1985). 
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The foregoing suggests an implication of the theory: the 
church is most important in providing social insurance in 
pre-modern states or in cases where communities are large 
enough that common interest is an insufficient motive to 
encourage income redistribution. The church uses funds from 
other sources and techniques discussed below to support 
these activities. The same argument applies to all of the 
socially desirable activities in which individual engage. 
For example, robbery is less likely to occur in small 
communities where enforcement and detection is relatively 
easy. In modern states, government enforcement is 
relatively more effective. The church has an advantage in 
the intermediate case. 
Heaven, an appealing afterlife, is a product offered by 
all of the world's major religions and most of the minor 
religions. Little needs be added here except that a 
contract for sale of heaven is unenforceable. The church is 
faced with the difficult problem of assuring the quality of 
a product whose characteristics cannot be determined. As 
other research shows (Bold and Hull, 1985), the church uses 
a priesthood and non-salvageable capital in forms like a 
cathedral to assure quality. 
Although heaven is not typically thought of as a 
product, the Catholic Church and most other religions 
certainly require the faithful to pay a price for heaven. 
The price includes prayer, faith, and donations. The last 
increases revenue to the church. In addition, and most 
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important for this model, the price of heaven commonly 
includes good behavior. What is good behavior? For 
Christian churches, good behavior includes following the Ten 
Commandments, the Golden Rule, and various other standards. 
A key thesis of the economic theory of religion is that 
the set of actions which constitute good behavior are 
coincident with the set of standards which maximizes net 
social welfare, reduces transactions costs, and defines and 
enforces property rights. It is the set of standards that 
are otherwise enforced by members of small communities or 
are enforced by the state. 
Why does the church enforce these standards? Because 
doing so promotes the wealth of the society, assures its 
survival, and gives it a c~mparative advantage compared to 
other societies. In so doing the church (unconsciously) 
assures its own survival and prosperity. This is simply 
another version of Stigler's (1958) survivorship principle. 
Only churches (and firms) which successfully maximize profit 
and promote welfare maximization in the long run tend to 
survive. 
Like several of the other products produced by the 
church, property rights enforcement in particular and good 
social behavior in general, are public goods. They produce 
benefits the value of which are not readily captured by the 
producer. The state uses coercion and involuntary taxation 
to assure provision of these products. These tools are also 
used by the Roman Catholic Church during the middle ages. 
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As mentioned, the church also uses the promise of heaven and 
threat of hell to encourage provision of these products. 
The church has a comparative advantage in property 
rights enforcement and enforcing other types of good social 
behavior in societies with a poorly developed central 
government, but in societies which are complex enough that 
enforcement is impractical at the local level. 
To summarize. The church can be modeled as a profit 
maximizing firm which, like all firms, offers a unique set 
of products. The church helps assure social welfare 
maximization since doing so profits the church in the long 
run. One important, although only partly intentional, 
product produced by the church is enforcement of property 
rights in particular and encouragement of good social 
behavior in general. The church has a comparative advantage 
in providing these products in relatively complex societies 
with weak central governments. The church uses coercion, 
involuntary taxation, heaven, and the threat of eternal 
damnation to provide financial support for its activities 
and to assure proper behavior. Now we turn to the Roman 




111.- Why Was Hell Rezoned? 
After the [Roman] Empire's collapse, the medieval 
society that emerged was a set of disjointed and 
clashing parts subject to no central or effective 
secular authority. Only the Church offered an 
organizing principle, which was the reason for 
its success, for society cannot bear anarchy. 
(Tuchman, 1978, p. 5) 
The Roman Catholic Church introduced and promoted 
heaven, hell, and judgement at death because these were 
effective tools in enforcing good social behavior and 
property rights in locations where state authority and local 
community enforcement were relatively ineffective. The 
feudal system, where local control of social behavior is 
possible, became relatively weaker as independent towns and 
cities emerged. The fragmented and weak central governments 
were unable to exercise control of either feudal lords or 
the independent cities and towns. The church possessed a 
comparative advantage in enforcing good behavior and 
provided this as a joint product of its revenue earning 
activities. 
Social systems survive and prosper to the extent that 
they protect property rights, assure efficient market 
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transactions, and provide valuable social services and 
security. Although it did not meet the impressive standards 
of the Roman Empire, the feudal system was reasonably well 
adapted for a primitive agrarian society. Manoral lords and 
knights provided public goods like defense and social 
security to relatively small insulated areas, supporting 
these activities with involuntary service and taxation. 
Lords and knights were only weakly linked to a central 
government which ideally provided security and other 
functions over a larger territory. 
Did Lords Misbehave? 
One interesting issue in analyzing the feudal system 
involves the monopoly power of the lords. The common 
perception of the relationship between lord and vassals is 
one of pure exploitation and near slavery. By this view, 
vassals had no power and so necessarily were mistreated. 
The role of the Catholic Church is typically perceived as 
encouraging vassals to live with their unfortunate lot in 
life--the church was the opiate of the people. This paper 
acknowledges the latter role of the Catholic Church, but 
addresses some additional important issues. 
That the feudal lord possessed nearly absolute political 
and economic power is not disputed here. In addition, since 
the feudal system, including the central government, 
enforced the exclusive and absolute power of local lords, 
competition from other potential lords for a given lord's 
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monopoly power was absent. Further, vassals were tied to 
the land and so could not exert competitive pressure by 
voting with their feet. 
Two forces acted to prevent lords from fully exploiting 
their monopoly position, however. First, following one of 
this paper's important themes, the long run prosperity and 
survival of the lord depended in large part on his ability 
to assure the prosperity of his vassals. An excessively 
exploitive lord would lose wealth and power relative to 
nearby lords and so would face possible loss of territory. 
The lord was compelled to provide efficient incentives to 
vassals. 
A second force encouraging proper behavior by the lord 
was the Catholic Church, directly through its own doctrine 
and persuasion and indirectly through the knightly codes of 
behavior. Although little direct evidence exists to show 
that lords treated vassals better because of church doctrine 
and pressure, other lordly behavior provides an indirect 
clue. In particular, lords provided significant financial 
support to local churches. 5 Lords donated the money to 
assure themselves a good afterlife. Church doctrine 
encouraged these financial contributions, but church 
doctrine also required of individuals good social behavior 
to achieve a desirable afterlife. Because we observe of 
lords the money contributions, we can reasonably infer their 
sAries (1981) throughout his book describes financial 
contributions of the gentry. 
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good behavior. The work of authors like Ladurie (1978) who 
documents the daily lives of villagers in F~ance and Homans 
(1960) who does the same for Great Britian confirms that the 
relationship between lord and vassal was generally good. 
Knights, and remember that lords were usually knights, 
gradually came to adopt a code of christian behavior. 
Although often only implied, at least one formal set of 
guidelines was compiled. Sonizo of Sutri wrote the Liber de 
Vita Christiana (c. 1090). The code promoted loyalty, 
bravery, and justice. It enjoined knights to protect the 
poor, widows, and orphans, and to eschew plunder. The 
guidelines clearly encouraged the sort of good social 
behavior theorized here. The guidelines even placed limits 
on warfare; that it not too much interfere with ordinary 
economic activity. 
The Independent Cities 
That the feudal system endured for so long is evidence 
of its ability to provide for its members. However, the 
feudal system was poorly adapted to encourage economic 
growth and development. The system discouraged the 
interregional trade that would allow specialization and 
industrialization in turn promoting the exploitation of 
economies of scale. These functions were gradually provided 
by cities and towns independent of feudal authority. 
Feudal lords usually granted the status of independent 
"communes" to cities and towns in exchange for tax payments 
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from the citizens and from craft guilds. Lords made the 
grants because of financial, political, or social 
pressure.' Grants were made throughout the middle ages, 
but the pace rose significantly in the beginning of the 
twelfth century. The most successful independent cities 
were trading centers like Venice, Genoa, and Lubeck. 
Because feudal authority did not extend into these 
independent communities and, as Tuchman (1978) explains, 
because central governments were as yet too immature to 
exercise control, other means evolved to produce the social 
goods condusive to social wealth maximization. Certainly 
craft guilds provided social services to members (Tuchman, 
1978, p. 39), in addition to guild business practice. 7 
More interesting for this paper, are the activities and 
doctrine of the mendicant religious orders. 
Mendicant Orders 
The Pope confirmed three of the mendicant orders in the 
first half of the thirteenth century: the Fransiscans, 
Dominicans, and Carmelites. The Augustinians were confirmed 
shortly after the middle of the century. Why are the 
mendicant orders of interest here? Because they were 
'For a summary see Tuchman (1978), p. 5 and Braudel 
(1979), p. 510. 
7Interestingly, the sort of lifetime social security 
provided by craft guilds in an era of weak central 
government has parallels to behavior of large companies in 




established in large part to spread Catholic doctrine to 
independent cities and towns. 
In addition to their common charge, each order had 
additional unique characteristics. The Fransiscan Order, 
for example, was also required to engage in scientific 
activity. This is another public good not easily produced 
in ordinary markets. This function was eventually taken 
over by state funded universities, particularly in the 
'fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, not surprisingly, during 
a period of decline in Catholic Church power. 
The Dominican Order became the order of the Inquisition. 
The Inquisition u~ed torture, imprisonment, and death--tools 
also available to secular authority--to enforce good 
christian behavior. Also available was the social ostracism 
and eternal damnation of excommunication, a method of 
punishment uniquely available to the church. 
The mendicant orders shared a number of important 
characteristics, particularly their fundamental doctrine. 
The doctrine and behavior of the mendicant orders conforms 
in a number of ways to that predicted by the theory. The 
ideal was Imitatio Christi--to live the life of Christ. 
Loyalty to the order and then to the Pope was paramount. 
The orders required of their members poverty, chastity, and 
obedience and enforced this in part by encouraging itinerant 
preaching, an activity which discouraged individual wealth 
accumulation. Previous work by the author shows how vows 
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like those above help assure consumers that priests 
sincerely believe their doctrine (Bold and Hull, 1975). 
What did the mendicants preach? The mendicants wanted 
to persuade urban dwellers to convert to their version of . 
the catholic doctrine. This implied proper social behavior. 
The mendicants wanted converts to behave properly, but the 
orders could not rely on secular authority to enforce good 
behavior. The state was not powerful and a priest could not 
draw on the power of the lord to enforce proper behavior. 
To solve this enforcement problem, the mendicants invented 
or at least exploited the inventions of hell and judgement 
at death. Hell and judgement at death increase the cost of 
misbehavior. Hell increases both the expected cost and 
variance in payoffs after death of improper behavior. To 
the extent that individuals are risk averse, an increase in 
variance also effectively increases expected cost. 
Judgement at death is more costly in present value terms 
than judgement at the end of time to the extent that 
individuals possess a positive discount rate. 8 
What about the role of purgatory, also promoted by the 
mendicants? Since purgatory allowed the dead a second 
chance, it encouraged donations of money after death to the 
church for prayer and good works. Perhaps more important, 
purgatory prevented individuals from intentionally or 
8The church also discouraged, to a greater or lesser 
degree, charging positive interest on loans (usury). See 
The Idea of Usury. If the church is able to use this rule 
to reduce individual discount rates, the present value of 
heaven and present cost of hell increase. 
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accidentally defaulting on money debts at death. Relatives, 
heirs, or provisions in wills were used to redeem a debtor 
who would otherwise be condemned to eternal damnation. 
Protecting property rights in financial instruments was 
an important function in which the church had a comparative 
advantage. Towns and cities were beginning to use money­
based trade, including debt instruments. Absent, however, 
were some of the methods available in modern economies to 
protect lenders. The corporation had not yet formed so 
asset ownership was limited to one lifetime and one 
individual. The absence of life insurance on borrowers 
increased the risk born by a lender. Finally, secular 
courts and other feudal authority were absent from the 
independent communities. The church as an enforcer of 
financial property rights was the obvious alternative. 
From what evidence has survived, the promise of heaven 
and threat of hell did influence individual behavior in a 
socially desirable way. In addition to providing for 
repayment of debt, individual wills show clearly that 
substantial resources were redistributed to the poor and and 
other deserving groups, exactly sort of redistribution that 
was otherwise provided by feudal lords or by modern central 
governments. Wills commonly set aside money and detailed 
the desired burial ceremony. Much of the money for the 
ceremony went to hiring the poor as mourners and attendants. 
[Priests and Monks] were followed by a group, whose 
size varied according to the wealth and generosity of 
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the deceased, made up of poor people and children from 
foundling homes. They carried candles and torches, 
and, in addition to the robes, they were given alms in 
exchange for their attendance. (Aries, 1981, p. 165) 
Wills also allocated money for activities after the 
burial. Some portion prayed for prayers for the dead, an 
activity that hardly improves temporal social welfare. 
However, even these donations went to the church which in 
turn used it to support charitable activities. By far the 
largest proportion of bequests went to fund charitable 
endowments.' 
Besides these endowments for Masses .•. there were 
also charitable endowments: a contribution to a 
hospital for a bed, or the living expenses or dowry of 
a poor girl. Donations to abbeys, monasteries, and 
schools were common and generous in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. (Aries, 1981, p. 181) 
Interesting, but not surprising, the above quote also 
shows that the period of maximum donation to charities was 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, exactly the period 
corresponding to greatest church influence. The church was 
successful in encouraging income redistribution in exactly 
the era of its comparative advantage in doing so. 
Another socially desirable characteristic of wills is 
that they encourage accumulation of temporal wealth. The 
'Refer especially to work by Elaine Clark. 
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traditional christian ideal was of lifetime poverty and 
humbleness. If it allowed an wealthy individual to purchase 
heaven at death, the will obviously encourages wealth 
accumulation. With a will, both temporal and heavenly 
riches are possible. "The will •.• legitimized and 
authorized the enjoyment--otherwise suspect--of property 
acquired during a lifetime" (Aries, 1981, p 191). This 
opportunity provided incentive for economic growth and 
development. It created incentive to maximize wealth and 
assured that the wealth was redistributed. Again the church 
encourages social wealth maximization. 
III. Conclusion 
Roman Catholic Church doctrine about heaven, hell, and 
judgement changed during the high middle ages. Instead of 
the promise of heaven for everyone at the end of time, 
judgement came to take place at the moment of death and 
carried with it the possibility of eternal damnation. In 
addition, purgatory became a place of trail, offering a 
second chance to those not completely damned. 
These changes are consistent with an economic theory of 
religion and the church. The church, like any firm, offers 
a set of products that exploit economies of scale and scope 
and comparative advantage. One church product, often 
produced unintentionally and jointly with other products, is 
good social behavior and property rights enforcement. 
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The church has an advantage in producing these latter 
two products when the local community and the central 
government are relatively weak, exactly the condition during 
the high middle ages, particularly in the emerging 
independent towns and cities. As might be predicted, the 
Catholic Church empowered the mendicant orders to preach to 
urban dwellers. The mendicant orders also promoted the 
doctrine of hell, purgatory, and judgement at death. Hell 
increases the expected cost of misbehavior. Immediate 
judgement increases the present value of heaven and present 
cost of hell and thus the variance in outcomes at death. 
Purgatory encourages donations and prevents individuals from 
avoiding money debts. 
This application of the economic theory of religion and 
the church is obviously very limited in scope, explaining 
only one change in church doctrine during a period of 
significant change in all aspects of culture and society. 
This application also offers no explanation for the eventual 
decline (and near collapse) of the church in the fourteenth 
century. Certainly the plagues, which struck urban areas in 
particular, played a role. The prolonged warfare and the 
emergence of national identities likely also played a role 
in eroding the power of a "universal" international church. 
Despite its limitations, this work breaks important 
ground in applying economic theory to a new area of society. 
This research shows that economic theory can now predict 
changes in religious behavior and such an extension has 
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potential application to most of human history and most of 
the world's cultures. It should be able to explain 
religious issues as varied as why some cultures have 
multiple gods and the emergence of atheism as a dominate 
attitude in the twentieth century. 
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